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I. INTRODUCTION
Having recently celebrated its ten-year anniversary, Bitcoin
should be considered a qualified success. In October 2020, each unit'
was worth about $10,700, and the entire market capitalization was
approximately $200 billion.2 Bitcoin is a significant economic force
with sizable market value. Despite this success, however, Bitcoin has
not been widely adopted as a method of payment, which was its in-
tended use.3
By providing a template for a durable cryptocurrency, Bitcoin also
blazed a path for other cryptocurrency projects. In terms of market
capitalization and current importance, Ethereum is comfortably in
second place.4 In October 2020, it had a market capitalization of ap-
proximately $40 billion. 5 Unlike Bitcoin, however, Ethereum was not
designed primarily to serve as a method of payment. Ethereum sup-
ports a system of sophisticated "smart contracts" that would not work
on the Bitcoin system.
Smart contracts and cryptocurrencies have sparked considerable
interest among legal scholars in recent years, and a growing body of
scholarship focuses on whether smart contracts and cryptocurrencies
1. In this Article, Bitcoin (capitalized) will refer to the overall system for this partic-
ular cryptocurrency. In contrast, bitcoin (lowercase) will refer to units of the
cryptocurrency. This Article will also use the abbreviation BTC to refer to bitcoin
units. A parallel example using United States currency might illuminate this dis-
tinction. The dollar can refer to the entire system of currency, or it can refer to
the individual units. Also, the abbreviation USD (or $) refers to dollar units.
Other currencies separately name the system and the units. For example, the
renminbi is the Chinese currency, while the yuan is the unit of the currency.
Similarly, Ethereum is a cryptocurrency system with units called ether.
2. See Bitcoin (BTC), COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/
bitcoin [https:/perma.unl.edu/PU6X-9H76] (last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
3. See DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE POTENTIAL DECLINE OF CASH
USAGE AND RELATED IMPLICATIONS 15 (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/R/R45716 [https://perma.unl.edu/PK4X-EYWX] ("Certain analyses
appear to show that digital currencies are not being widely used and accepted as
payment for goods and services, but rather as investment vehicles.").
4. See Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalization, COINMARKETCAP, https://
coinmarketcap.com [https://perma.unl.edu/4WHX-WMAE] (last visited Jan. 30,
2020).
5. See Ethereum (ETH), COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/
ethereum[https://perma.unl.edu/274A-WH9A] (last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
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can sidestep law and regulation altogether.6 Bitcoin is famously de-
centralized, without any central actor controlling the system. Its users
remain largely anonymous, using alphanumeric addresses instead of
legal names. Ethereum shares these traits and also supports smart
contracts that can automate the transfer of the Ethereum cryptocur-
rency (known as ether). Ethereum also supports specialized "tokens"
that can be tied to the ownership of assets, goods, and services that
exist completely outside of the Ethereum blockchain.
The goal of this Article is to evaluate the degree to which
cryptocurrencies and smart contracts can operate outside the reach of
law and regulation. By some accounts, cryptocurrencies and smart
contracts will revolutionize private law.7 Some argue they have the
potential to displace contract and property law. For example, in a pre-
vious article, I argued that Bitcoin represents a system of private
property that exists wholly outside of traditional legal structures.8 In
this Article, I will argue that a complete revolution is not inexorable.9
Facing the technical and complicated nature of this subject, we should
keep in mind a simple fact: cryptocurrencies and smart contracts are
computer data and computer programs. To a large extent, they will
have legal force only if given force by judges, regulators, and
legislators.
Part II describes Bitcoin and how it creates a system of property
that exists outside of legal structures. Bitcoin is special because it con-
trols no external assets (like securities, dollars, or gold). It is purely
"notional" property that exists only on a computer file.
Part III describes Ethereum and how it builds upon the principles
of Bitcoin. The primary innovation of Ethereum is smart contracts,
which allow for variable and conditional transfers of cryptocurrency.
6. See, e.g., Hilary J. Allen, $=e=Bitcoin?, 76 MD. L. REV. 877 (2017) (describing the
relationship between cryptocurrencies and payment systems); Eric D. Chason, A
Tax on the Clones: The Strange Case of Bitcoin Cash, 39 VA. TAx REV. 1 (2019)
(describing the challenges that cryptocurrency innovation poses to the income
tax); Eric D. Chason, Cryptocurrency Hard Forks and Revenue Ruling 2019-24,
39 VA. TAx REV. 279 (2019) (same); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, BitProperty, 88 S. CAL.
L. REV. 805 (2015) (describing the relationship between cryptocurrencies and
property law).
7. See, e.g., PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW 5
(2018) ("With blockchains, people can construct their own systems of rules or
smart contracts, enforced by the underlying protocol of a blockchain-based net-
work. These systems create order without law and implement what can be
thought of as private regulatory frameworks .... ").
8. See Eric D. Chason, How Bitcoin Functions as Property Law, 49 SETON HALL L.
REV. 129 (2018).
9. Prior scholarship has noted convergence between "smart contracts" and tradi-
tional contract law. See, e.g., Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex
Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 382 (2017) ("Contract law is nothing if not resilient.
We have little doubt it will survive the onslaught from smart contracts, if indeed
that is what is happening.").
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To be of commercial value, however, smart contracts must incorporate
economic or financial information (e.g., interest rates or exchange
rates). Ethereum allows users to incorporate this information using
third party "oracles." While oracles allow for sophisticated transac-
tions, their presence illustrates some of the limits of smart contracts.
Part IV extends the discussion of Ethereum and explains how
many developers use it as a way to effectuate property transactions.
Tokens are specialized smart contracts used to represent ownership of
assets or certain privileges. Conceivably, ownership in any asset-
homes, cars, etc.-could be represented by Ethereum tokens. Rather
than using a deed of transfer, owners could simply transfer the repre-
sentative tokens.
Part V develops what this Article calls a "remote-computer model"
of Bitcoin and Ethereum. Because Bitcoin and Ethereum are com-
puter programs and computer data, we can view each as constituting a
single computer. This hypothetical computer is remote in the sense
that judges, regulators, and legislators can exercise little control over
it directly. The remote computer controls ownership of cryptocurrency
units, leaving direct cryptocurrency transactions outside the scope of
traditional legal institutions. That being said, smart contracts often
purport to control external resources and rights. For example, a smart
contract might purport to control the transfer of land or stock in a
corporation. These transactions have effects outside the hypothetical
remote computer and can potentially be subject to control by legal
institutions.
II. BITCOIN AND SIMPLE TRANSFERS
A. Digital Currency as Computer Data
Cryptocurrency units are essentially computer data. In Bitcoin, the
total units of circulating bitcoin are collectively referred to as unspent
transaction output (or UTXO).10 In rough terms, UTXO associates
bitcoin units with owners. Ownership of bitcoin is not, however, per-
sonal to individuals, corporations, or the other legal actors. Instead,
ownership is determined cryptographically, typically by controlling a
"private key" that "function[s] like a password."11 If Alice owns one
unit of bitcoin, it is because she controls the private key associated
with that unit.
10. See Andrew M. Hinkes, Throw Away the Key, or the Key Holder? Coercive Con-
tempt for Lost or Forgotten Cryptocurrency Private Keys, or Obstinate Holders, 16
Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 225, 258 n.183 (2019).
11. See Chason, supra note 8, at 141-42.
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In most Bitcoin transactions, the transferor sends the units of
bitcoin to the "address" of the recipient.12 We can imagine this address
as being like an account number. Each address, in turn, has an associ-
ated private key, which we can imagine as being like a password. Any-
one who knows the private key can, within the Bitcoin system,
transfer the associated bitcoin units to another address. So, in more
precise terms, UTXO associates bitcoin units with addresses, which
users control with private keys.
For purposes of this Article, the cryptographic details have lesser
importance. What is important, however, is that bitcoin ownership is
reflected in computer data and cryptographic control. Bitcoin is not
backed up by external securities, cash, or other investments. And, by
design, bitcoin ownership is not enforced by courts or other legal ac-
tors. For reasons discussed below,13 courts and other legal actors find
it difficult or impossible to deal directly with Bitcoin, Ethereum, and
many other cryptocurrencies.
To explain this difficulty, this Article will develop a legal model of
cryptocurrencies based on a single hypothetical computer.14 This hy-
pothetical computer holds the history of all prior transactions (known
as the blockchain) from which one can readily derive current owner-
ship (or UTXO). Importantly, this hypothetical computer is legally "re-
mote," meaning that judges, regulators, and legislators cannot alter
the data and programs held on the computer. The remote-computer
model will give us (as legal observers) a way to understand how the
law can and cannot interact with cryptocurrencies.
B. Problems with Centralized Digital Currency
1. Introduction
The remote-computer model is useful when dealing with legal
questions. But, as a technical matter, it does not fully describe Bitcoin
or Ethereum. These cryptocurrencies do not exist on a single computer
(remote or otherwise). Instead, they exist in practically identical form
on a multitude of different computers around the world.15 Because
each cryptocurrency exists in identical form on these computers, we
can imagine that it exists on a single computer. If Bitcoin or Ethereum
actually existed on a single, physical computer, however, it would not
12. See ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN 136 (Tim McGovern et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2017) ("The vast majority of transactions processed on the bitcoin
network spend outputs locked with a Pay-to-Public-Key-Hash .... These outputs
contain a locking script that locks the output to a public key hash, more com-
monly known as a bitcoin address.").
13. See infra section V.C.
14. See infra section II.D and Part V.
15. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 24 (describing process by which "the
network reaches consensus as to who owns what amount of bitcoin").
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be remote as described in our model. The computer would physically
exist somewhere, need power, etc. Moreover, some person would have
control over the physical computer. This section discusses the
problems that would plague a centralized (or non-remote) digital
currency.
2. Regulatory Oversight
When creating Bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto expressly wanted to
avoid centralized control.16 A centralized actor (e.g., a bank) could be
subject to laws, regulations, and politics that run contrary to the inter-
ests of the Bitcoin community. Nakamoto offered the somewhat idio-
syncratic and surprising example of reversible payments.17 A
consumer who pays for an item using a bank-issued credit card has
the right, by statute, to reverse the payment in certain circumstances.
Even if the community of users wants non-reversible transactions, a
central administrator would have to follow the law and allow for re-
versible payments.
Bitcoin would, by design, offer non-reversible payments.18 The goal
of non-reversible payments may seem like a relatively minor reason to
create an entirely new and private currency. And, making payments
non-reversible introduces an array of risks into the system. Victims of
credit card fraud, for example, have a wide array of remedies and pro-
tections. Victims of Bitcoin fraud or theft, in contrast, have none. The
best the victim could hope for is for the thief to be arrested and forced
to return the stolen bitcoin as part of the judicial process.
For better or for worse, decentralization allows Bitcoin to operate
in a way that makes it nearly impervious to law and regulation. No
central administrator exists. Indeed, the system does not even differ-
entiate between different types of users. Everyone (including you and
me) has the same technical privileges within the system. Users inter-
act with the system through user addresses, which we can think of as
alphanumeric pseudonyms.19 Users can (and should) generate distinct
addresses for separate transactions. Because of this level of decentral-
ization, law and regulation have no easily identifiable person or entity
to control.
Since it operates outside the law, Bitcoin has often been used for
illegal purposes. The "Silk Road" market for illegal drugs was con-
16. See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN 1,
2, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.un.edu/S8TW-6ZCG (last visited
Jan. 30, 2020).
17. See id. at 1.
18. See id.
19. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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ducted almost entirely in Bitcoin before it was shut down in 2014.20
Additionally, computer malware often directs victims to pay bitcoin to
a certain address in exchange for returning control of the victims'
computers.2 1
We should not, however, dismiss Bitcoin as simply money for
criminals. Bitcoin (and Ethereum) are structures for conducting eco-
nomic transactions. And, as business lawyers know, some transac-
tional structures are subject to less regulation than others. For
example, anyone creating a business entity can choose from a wide
range of state laws (e.g., Delaware versus Virginia), entity types (e.g.,
corporation versus LLC), and tax treatments (e.g., taxable entities
versus pass-through entities).22 Would-be owners can look outside the
United States for even more options.23 Some of these non-U.S. options
are routinely abused.
More philosophically, Bitcoin achieves certain libertarian ideals.2 4
Governments routinely regulate markets by regulating central actors.
For example, the United States imposes extensive anti-money-laun-
dering regulations on financial institutions. The rationale behind
these regulations may be, in part, to address the possibility that the
institutions themselves are engaging in money laundering. However,
a more significant rationale is that customers may use financial insti-
tutions to engage in money laundering. Customer-level activity may
be hard for the government to detect directly, so the government com-
mands the assistance of the financial institution to monitor its cus-
tomers. Financial institutions are subject to "know your customer"
(KYC) rules and must also report certain transactions.2 5
A libertarian would likely object to such rules on the grounds that
they are overinclusive and invasive of financial privacy. Financial in-
stitutions must "know" and monitor all of their customers, not just the
small fraction that might be engaged in criminal activity.26 Also, anti-
money-laundering regulations commandeer the resources of all finan-
20. See generally CAROL GOFORTH, REGULATION OF CRYPTOTRANSACTIONS 117-58
(2020) (describing the Silk Road and resulting legal actions).
21. See generally Bitcoin Network, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin_
network#Alleged-criminal_?activity [https://perma.unl.edu/QZ7E-LU4G] (last
visited Jan. 30, 2020) (describing criminal activity surrounding Bitcoin).
22. See generally James M. Kehl, Choice of Entity: Organizational Issues, 700-4th
U.S. Income Portfolios (BNA) (2020) (describing relative advantages of different
organizational forms).
23. See id. at 62-70.
24. See SAIFEDEAN AMMOUS, THE BITCOIN STANDARD: THE DECENTRALIZED ALTERNA-
TIVE TO CENTRAL BANKING 200-05 (2018) (describing the individual sovereignty
offered by Bitcoin).
25. See Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation
in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 325-26 (2015) (discussing KYC require-




cial institutions, not because of their own activities but because of the
activities of customers. In the hands of sophisticated users, Bitcoin
can avoid such regulation.27 It has no central actor who acts as a gate-
keeper for users. No financial institution maintains Bitcoin accounts
for anyone. As a result, the government cannot deputize financial in-
stitutions to keep watch over Bitcoin users. Thus, Bitcoin offers far
more privacy and secrecy than traditional bank accounts.
As a monetary system, Bitcoin has no use for central banks, the
ultimate financial institution. Proponents claim that Bitcoin is "sound
money," unlike the U.S. dollar and other sovereign currency.2 8 The
supply of bitcoin is algorithmically fixed, and no central institution
has any power to alter the algorithm. In contrast, the supply of U.S.
dollars is determined largely at the discretion of the Federal Re-
serve.2 9 Whether this discretion is a good or bad thing is well beyond
the scope of this Article. This distinction between the U.S. dollar and
bitcoin is, nevertheless, illuminating. The U.S. dollar fluctuates in
supply because a central actor determines its supply. Bitcoin is fixed
in supply because no central actor can alter its supply.
3. Trust
The prior subsection noted that Bitcoin removes itself from the
control of politics and the regulatory state. Even if we thought such
forces were neutral or even beneficial, centralized control still has dis-
advantages. Suppose that Satoshi Nakamoto maintained Bitcoin on a
single computer. When creating Bitcoin, he developed a system that
automated many aspects of the transfer process and removed those
aspects from the discretion of a central administrator. For example, a
central administrator could not readily steal bitcoin units held by
other people.30 But, the central administrator could still harm the
functioning of the system in the following ways:
Denial of service. Suppose that Alice executes a computer file that
transfers 1 BTC to Bob. For the transfer to be effective, it must be
recorded on the central computer. The central administrator might
simply ignore Alice's transfer to Bob rendering Alice's 1 BTC worth-
less to her.3 1
27. See, e.g., supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing Silk Road case).
28. See AMMOUS, supra note 24, at 135-36 (describing principles of "sound money").
29. See id.
30. See ARVIND NARAYANAN, JOSEPH BONNEAU, EDWARD FELTEN, ANDREW MILLER &
STEVEN GOLDFEDER, BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES 34 (2016)
(describing how technology can prevent theft by a central administrator).
31. A leading introduction to Bitcoin discusses a hypothetical and centralized
"Scroogecoin" administered by "Scrooge." See id. at 22-25 (discussing Scrooge's
refusal to approve transactions).
2020] 337
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Assistance with fraud. Suppose that Alice executes a computer file
that transfers 1 BTC to Bob in exchange for $9,000. Hoping to keep
Bob's $9,000 and her 1 BTC, Alice executes another file that transfers
the very same 1 BTC to her spouse, Charlie. Alice also enlists the as-
sistance of the central administrator, who records the transfer to
Charlie (and rejects the transfer to Bob).
Abandoning the project. The central administrator might tire of the
project and simply shut down the computer on which it exists.32
When considering these examples, we can note similarities be-
tween the central administrator and the recorder of deeds to real prop-
erty.33 The recorder is a central party who records the deeds. That
system works because the parties believe they can trust the recorder
of deeds. Fraud or other malfeasance in that system is fairly easy to
discover and would be punishable under criminal law. Perhaps be-
cause it operates within the government, we also trust that the system
will exist for the foreseeable future.
Returning to Bitcoin, this trust does not obviously exist. Suppose
that the creator (Satoshi Nakamoto) gave himself authority to act as
the recorder of all Bitcoin transactions. If he engaged in a fraud, we
might not discover it, and the authorities might not be able to prose-
cute him. Participants might worry that Nakamoto (acting as re-
corder) would become disinterested at some point, pull the plug
(literally and figuratively), and let the whole system collapse. Moreo-
ver, the police might not even treat Nakamoto as a criminal if he
manipulated the hypothetical record of Bitcoin deeds. In short, parties
to real estate transactions can trust their central registry; parties to a
Bitcoin transaction cannot.
C. Bitcoin and Decentralization
This section focuses on Bitcoin and how it achieves decentraliza-
tion.34 Remarkably, Bitcoin achieves consensus about ownership of
bitcoin units even though no central party administers it. As we will
see, the main innovation of Bitcoin is organizational rather than
technical.
We saw that UTXO is computer data that associates bitcoin units
with owners (or their alphanumeric addresses).3 5 For Bitcoin to func-
tion as a currency, owners must be able to transfer their units to new
32. See id.
33. See Chason, supra note 8, passim.
34. Ethereum has similar mechanics in dealing with transfers of its underlying
cryptocurrency. See generally ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS & GAVIN WOOD, MAS-
TERING ETHEREUM 99-125 (Rachel Roumeliotis et al. eds., 2018) (discussing tech-
nical aspects of Ethereum transactions).




owners. Mechanically, Bitcoin uses a system of transfer that resem-
bles real estate transfers.3 6 When transferring ownership, users exe-
cute computer files that resemble deeds. They identify themselves
with alphanumeric addresses rather than legal names. And, they exe-
cute digital signatures rather than signing with pen and paper.
Bitcoin replicates the functions of a centralized recorder of deeds
but does so without any centralized party. In the world of real prop-
erty transfers, transferees record their deeds with a central registry.
Doing so alerts other would-be transferees of the transfer. For exam-
ple, Bob would check with the recorder of deeds before accepting a
deed from Alice conveying Blackacre to him. If Bob found a prior deed
(e.g., by which Alice conveyed Blackacre to Charlie), then Bob would
know that Alice is trying to defraud him.
Conversely, transactional data is recorded on the Bitcoin
blockchain in a form that most readers cannot decipher directly. That
being said, the essential transactional data can be formatted in a way
that people can readily interpret once they have some knowledge of
how Bitcoin operates. Consider an actual transaction from the very
early days of Bitcoin. In May 2010, a man wanted to conduct the first
commercial transaction denominated in bitcoin.3 7 In an internet fo-
rum, he offered to pay 10,000 BTC for two pizzas.38 At the time, this
amount of bitcoin was worth about $25.39 In October 2020, this same
amount was worth $107 million.40














36. See Chason, supra note 8, passim.
37. See Molly Jane Zuckerman, Bitcoin Pizza Guy: Laszlo Hanyecz on Why Bitcoin Is




39. See Bitcoin History BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/Bitcoinhistory#
Bitcoin_in_2010 [https://perma.unl.edu/YRW9-WSFG] (last visited June 15,
2020).
40. See Bitcoin (BTC), supra note 2 (describing October 2020 exchange rate).




This collection of numbers and letters is meaningless to the human
reader. However, a computer can easily interpret it,42 and the inter-
preted rendering bears many similarities to a formal deed. It identi-
fies the transferor and the transferee by their Bitcoin addresses.43 It
also identifies the 10,000 BTC which were the subject of the
transfer.4 4
The life cycle of Bitcoin transactions follows a pattern. First, the
participants (transferor and transferee) form the transaction pri-
vately. The result of that formation is something like the "hex data"
shown above, which is a convenient and compact form for transmis-
sion. They would not manually create the data but would rely upon
"wallet software" to create the hex data for them.4 5 As just noted, this
hex data can be decoded into a form that resembles a deed, and we can
think of the formation of the hex data as the preparation and execu-
tion of a deed.4 6
Next, the parties broadcast the transaction (using hex data) to
other users on the Bitcoin network. They do not transmit the transac-
tion to a central party (like a bank) because no central Bitcoin author-
ity exists. The Bitcoin users who receive the transaction will then
share the hex data with other users. Because the hex data contains a
digital signature, it is resistant to tampering. We can think of this
step as presenting a deed to the recorder's office.
Finally, a Bitcoin "miner" will include the hex data in a block that
will become part of the Bitcoin blockchain. The mining process will
check the validity of the transaction. In particular, the transaction
cannot be included on the blockchain if doing so would result in a
"double spend." For example, if Alice transfers 1.5 BTC to Bob, the
mining process would prevent any later attempt by Alice to transfer
the same 1.5 BTC to Charlie. In the case of the hex data above (i.e.,
from the pizza deal), it was included on block 57044 on May 22,
2010.47 We can think of this step as when the recorder of deeds ac-
cepts a deed, stamps it, and records it. Like the county's collection of
WGV9] (last visited Jan. 30, 2020). The linked webpage is a "blockchain explorer"
that allows anyone with an internet connection to examine Bitcoin transactions.
See CLIFFORD CHANCE, BUSTING BITCOIN'S ANONYMITY-THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FI-
NANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 2 (2019), https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam//
briefings/2019/09/busting-bitcoins-anonymity-the-implications-for-financial-in-
stitutions.pdf [https://perma.un.edu/3AVT-VNUU].
42. See Summary, BLOCKCHAIN, https://blockchain.info/tx/cca7507897abc89628f4
50e8bleOc6fca4ec3f7b34cccf55f3f53lc659ff4d79 [https://perma.unl.edu/R2DS-
4DWB] (last visited Jan. 30, 2020).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HAS-
TINGS SC. & TECH. L.J. 159, 180 (2012) (discussing Bitcoin wallets).
46. See Chason, supra note 8, at 146-50.
47. Summary, supra note 42.
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deeds, the entire history of Bitcoin transactions is accessible by any-
one. Blockchain explorers allow users to inspect any Bitcoin transac-
tion they like (e.g., the pizza-deal transaction described above).4 8 The
explorer will present important information like the addresses of the
transferor and the transferee and the amount of bitcoin transferred.
In sum, the hex data functions like a legal document, and the
blockchain functions like a recorder of deeds. We cannot read the hex
data directly, but converting it to a human-readable form is a trivial
computing task. Once the transaction (represented by the hex data) is
included in the blockchain, the transferor may no longer spend the
transferred bitcoin. Recordation of deeds serves a similar function,
preventing the transferor from fraudulently selling the same real
property twice. Moreover, the blockchain, like the record of deeds, is
open to the public for inspection.
Of course, differences do exist between the Bitcoin system and the
system of real property transfers. Formally, the parties identify them-
selves using alphanumeric addresses rather than using their legal
names. Thus, Bitcoin users can operate with some degree of anonym-
ity.4 9 The most extreme example is that "Satoshi Nakamoto" is the
founder of Bitcoin and owns bitcoin worth a fortune. We do not, how-
ever, have reliable evidence to say who Satoshi Nakamoto is.50
More substantively, real property deeds control the transfer of
land, which has inherent value recognized across centuries. If you own
land, you have the right not only to transfer it but also to occupy it,
rent it, and extract its natural resources. Bitcoin, in contrast, is a ten-
year-old creation that is backed by no external assets. If you own
bitcoin, you have the right to transfer it but nothing more.
D. Bitcoin as a Remote Computer
As discussed more below, observers often compare Ethereum to a
"world computer."51 It is a computer because users can execute pro-
grams using a general-purpose programming language. It is a world
computer because the programs are executed in identical fashion
across the entire network of users. Your laptop computer is surely dif-
ferent from mine in the types of programs it runs, the data it stores,
etc. Ethereum, in contrast, is identical regardless of who runs it. This
48. See id.
49. See Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 38, 42 (2013) ("[C]ryptocurrency accounts are anonymous.
Users can start as many online 'wallets' as they want to buy or mine Bitcoins and
trade them without ever providing any identifying information.").
50. Heather Hughes, Blockchain and the Future of Secured Transactions Law, 3
STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL'Y 21, 30 n.30 (2020) ("The conclusive identity of
Satoshi Nakamoto remains elusive.").
51. See infra section V.A.
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Article uses a similar concept-calling Ethereum a "remote com-
puter"-to emphasize its ability to operate outside of traditional legal
structures.52
Bitcoin is certainly remote in this way. Because it is decentralized,
legal authorities cannot directly exercise control over it. Bitcoin also
has some characteristics of a computer. It holds data, which links all
previously issued bitcoin units (UTXO) with current owners (or their
addresses). Bitcoin also includes a protocol by which owners can trans-
fer these units and by which new units are produced. Thus, someone
owns bitcoin units because they have the ability to make a transfer of
units and change the UTXO.
This computer model also reinforces the point that Bitcoin does not
have any underlying assets like securities, precious metals, or sover-
eign currency.5 3 Ownership is only UTXO (which is computer data)
and the ability to change that data by making a transfer (which is
accomplished using cryptography and a computer protocol). Policy-
makers routinely regulate investment assets like securities, but they
cannot indirectly regulate Bitcoin by regulating any underlying
assets.
III. ETHEREUM AND SMART CONTRACTS
A. Bitcoin Smart Contracts as Locks
Bitcoin offers a weak version of what are commonly called smart
contracts. At this point in the Article, we must not assume that such
smart contracts resemble legal contracts at all. This section will de-
scribe Bitcoin smart contracts as cryptographic locks. The lock can be
more sophisticated than simply knowing a password (or private key),
and the most common forms of Bitcoin smart contracts resemble joint-
ownership arrangements rather than traditional legal contracts. Some
Bitcoin smart contracts do have limited contractual characteristics
(e.g., offering rewards for solving cryptographic puzzles).54
Recall that ownership of bitcoin units means the ability to transfer
those units.55 If Alice owns 1.5 BTC, it is because she has the ability to
transfer 1.5 BTC to another user. Moreover, no one else has this abil-
52. Cf Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David Wishnick, Coin-
Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 603 (2019) (referring to Ethereum
as a "world computer").
53. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 U. MIAMI
Bus. L. REV. 1, 4 n.3 (2016) ("[B]itcoin can be considered a fiat currency in that it
also has no underlying asset.").
54. See David Canellis, There's $70,000 Worth of Bitcoin Hidden Inside This Image,
TNW (June 25, 2019, 11:21 UTC), https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2019/06/25/
satoshi-treasure-bitcoin-cryptocurrency-prize-puzzle [https://perma.unl.edu/
L7TN-FSGT].
55. See supra section ILA.
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ity. In a standard transaction, Bitcoin transfers occur between Bitcoin
addresses.56 Continuing with Alice and a standard transaction, as-
sume someone previously transferred 1.5 BTC to the Bitcoin address
that Alice controls. Alice controls this address (and thus the 1.5 BTC)
by knowing a private key associated with the address. Alice's 1.5 BTC
are locked cryptographically. If she (and only she) knows the appropri-
ate private key, then she alone can unlock the 1.5 BTC by transferring
it to another user.57 As a result, we can say that Alice owns the 1.5
BTC.
This standard pay-to-public-key-hash transaction dominates
Bitcoin, but other transactions are possible. Parties can also transfer
bitcoin to "scripts," which are a set of conditions expressed in a simple
programming language. Anyone who can satisfy the conditions can
spend the bitcoin. For example, a Bitcoin transaction might be trans-
ferred to the control of multiple transferees. Alice might transfer her
1.5 BTC to the control of three transferees-Bob, Charlie, and
Darlene. Two of the three transferees could agree to spend the 1.5
BTC.58 Bitcoin commentators would call this structure a smart con-
tract. A lawyer, however, would simply consider it a form of joint own-
ership between Bob, Charlie, and Darlene.
Another common condition is to restrict the transferee from spend-
ing the bitcoin until a certain amount of time has elapsed. For exam-
ple, Alice might transfer 1.5 BTC to Bob subject to the restriction that
Bob cannot spend the 1.5 BTC until three months have passed.59
Again, lawyers would likely not consider this structure contractual.
Instead, Bob appears to own the 1.5 BTC subject to some restriction
rather than being subject to some obligation to provide goods or ser-
vices to Alice.
A handful of "puzzle transactions" do offer the glimmer of a con-
tractual offer.60 Suppose that I wanted to offer a 1 BTC reward to
anyone who could guess what I am thinking about. Secretly, I am
thinking about the Preamble to the United States Constitution, but
publicly I cannot reveal this fact. To implement the puzzle, I announce
that the winner is the first person to identify data that, when
56. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing pay-to-public-key-hash
transactions).
57. See Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Comment, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital
Currency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 111,
117 (2012) ("[Bitcoin] can only be accessed through the use of the associated pri-
vate key.").
58. See ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 12, at 149 (describing multisignature
transactions).
59. See id. at 157 (describing timelock transactions).
60. See Script: Transaction Puzzle, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/




processed with a cryptographic hash function, will produce the follow-
ing output:
bdec063f229e703e19570569fc552f44a936b528764620fa1 bf7f3fa93202f626 1
The hash function finds many uses in cryptocurrencies. In this case, it
allows me to make a commitment without revealing information. I
know what I am thinking about (the Preamble to the United States
Constitution), and I want to commit to paying a 1 BTC reward to the
first person who guesses this fact. I do not, however, want to reveal
what I am thinking about. More generally, a cryptographic hash func-
tion takes some textual input (e.g., the Preamble) and returns a seem-
ingly random textual output (e.g., bdec063f22 . . . ).62 The permissible
input is text (or a "string") of any size, but the output must be fixed in
length.63
It is possible to implement this "guess what I am thinking" game
using the Bitcoin script. In fact, a Bitcoin user created a very similar
challenge in 2012 (using the first Bitcoin transaction rather than the
Preamble to the United States Constitution as the subject).64 This
puzzle transaction does seem like a contractual offer, making bitcoin
payable to anyone who can perform some task. In my Preamble puz-
zle, I knew that I was thinking about the Preamble, and I simply
wanted someone to guess what I was thinking. The Preamble puzzle
might offer some recreational value to the participants. Beyond that,
it is difficult to identify any economic potential.
An important feature of cryptographic hashes is that they are "col-
lision resistant."65 "A collision occurs when two distinct inputs pro-
duce the same output."66 My Preamble puzzle, for example, would not
work well if some other input text (like the Declaration of Indepen-
dence) produced the same hash output. To win the puzzle, the player
would either need to identify the Preamble or stumble upon some
other solution simply with blind luck. In 2013, a Bitcoin enthusiast
created a puzzle transaction that would pay almost 2.5 BTC to anyone
61. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.; SHA-256 Hash Calculator, XORBIN, https://xorbin.com/
tools/sha256-hash-calculator [https://perma.unl.edu/48KT-XJ7S] (last visited
Jan. 30, 2020). People will get this output when the Preamble is put into the hash
function. You can try this by inputting "WE THE PEOPLE of the United States,
in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tran-
quility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish
this CONSTITUTION for the United States of America." into the hash calculator
linked to in this note.
62. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 2.
63. Id.
64. See Script: Transaction Puzzle, supra note 60 ("The required data happened to be
the Genesis block, and the given hash in the script was the genesis block header
hashed twice with SHA-256.").
65. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 2-5.
66. Id. at 2.
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who could identify a specific cryptographic collision.67 This "collision
puzzle" is one puzzle transaction that may have economic substance
beyond recreation because many cryptographic projects rely on hash
functions.
In broader terms, the collision puzzle offered a bounty to the first
person who could identify a particular cryptographic weakness. The
collision puzzle, like the Preamble puzzle, does have contractual ele-
ments resembling an offer. Despite their contractual nature, however,
these puzzle contracts do not seem to point toward a fuller use of
Bitcoin as a commercial platform. In both cases, performance was
measured cryptographically (because the task to be performed was
cryptographic) based on a hash function. Other Bitcoin smart con-
tracts are possible, but performance must be such that it can be
proven cryptographically.6 8
B. Limits of Bitcoin Smart Contracts
1. Variable-Payment Contracts
Consider a relatively simple option contract based on the relative
value of gold (i.e., the precious metal) and bitcoin units. In October
2020, 1 BTC was worth about 6 ounces of gold.69 Alice and Bob agree
that if gold becomes more valuable six months from now, Bob will pay
Alice the excess value measured in bitcoin. For example, if after six
months 6 ounces of gold is worth 1.2 BTC, then Bob must pay Alice an
additional 0.2 BTC; if 6 ounces of gold is worth 1.7 BTC at that point,
then Bob must pay Alice an additional 0.7 BTC, etc. In contrast, if gold
does not become more valuable over this time period, no further pay-
ment occurs.70 Because the contract can benefit only Alice, she makes
an upfront payment to Bob.
Continuing with the example, let us assume that the contract has a
maximum payment of 1 BTC. Alice and Bob want to deploy their con-
67. Script: Incentivized Finding of Hash Collisions, BITCOIN WIKI, https:/en.bit
coin.it/wiki/Script#Incentivized&findingof_hash_collisions [https://perma.
unl.edu/L9ED-2LUH] (last visited Jan. 30, 2020).
68. The Ethereum White Paper gives a more sophisticated example of a potential
Bitcoin smart contract: "[O]ne can even construct a script that says something
like 'this Bitcoin UTXO is yours if you can provide [cryptographic] proof that you
sent [another cryptocurrency] transaction of this denomination to me', essentially
allowing decentralized cross-cryptocurrency exchange." VITALIK BUTERIN, ETHER-
EUM WHITE PAPER 12 (2013), https://cryptorating.eu/whitepapers/Ethereum/
_whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.un.edu/4CBQ-992R].
69. In rough terms, the October 2020 prices were $10,700 per 1 BTC and $1,880 per
ounce of gold. Bitcoin (BTC), supra note 2; Daily Gold Price History, USAGOLD,
https://www.usagold.com/reference/prices/goldhistory.php?ddYears=2020 [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/BMC3-NYYA (last visited Oct. 8, 2020).
70. This arrangement is a cash-or-nothing option. JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES,
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 606-07 (Donna Battista et al. eds., 9th ed. 2015).
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tract on the Bitcoin blockchain using a smart contract. Because the
transaction is more complex than transferring bitcoin to an address,
Bob would pay 1 BTC to a Bitcoin "script."71 The transfer of 1 BTC
essentially secures Bob's performance, whereas the script determines
the future payout.72 The script should measure the price of 6 ounces of
gold relative to bitcoin six months from today and pay Alice the excess
of the six-month price (1.2 BTC or 1.7 BTC in our examples) over the
current price of gold (1 BTC in this contract). Any amounts not paid to
Alice would return to Bob.
The contract is seemingly mechanical and involves little discretion
on anyone's part. Nevertheless, Alice and Bob could not deploy this
contract on the Bitcoin blockchain. First (and more obviously), the
Bitcoin blockchain does not incorporate the relative values of gold and
bitcoin. Of course, markets exist for both gold and bitcoin. Contract
law allows Alice and Bob to specify, with precision, which markets
they wish to use for their contract. But, they would have no way to
express that agreement on the Bitcoin blockchain.
Second (and less obviously), the Bitcoin scripting language does
not offer a way to have variable payments from a single transaction.
Alice and Bob have agreed that Bob's payments should vary along
with the relative prices of gold and bitcoin. Contract law easily accom-
modates this deal. The Bitcoin script does not because payments are
"all-or-nothing." 73 Like a lock, the Bitcoin script is either opened or
closed. There is no ability to allow for a variable, contingent
transfer.74
As noted earlier, Bitcoin smart contracts rely on cryptographic
locks. As the Ethereum White Paper notes, "[T]here is no way for a
[Bitcoin] script to provide fine-grained control over the amount that
can be withdrawn." 7 5 Many significant contracts are, of course, either
all or nothing. Life insurance policies are one obvious example. The
insured is either dead or not, and death triggers payment of a set
amount. Gambling contracts are another example. Typically, gam-
blers win a pot (collected from a group of gamblers) or a fixed amount.
Nevertheless, many contracts are inherently variable in nature. De-
71. See ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 12, at 151-55 (describing pay-to-script-hash
transactions).
72. See HULL, supra note 70 (describing price calculations for binary options).
73. See BUTERIN, supra note 68 (discussing "value-blindness" of Bitcoin smart con-
tracts). Alice and Bob could create several mini-contracts, each of which is all or
nothing. For example, they could break their deal into 100 separate contracts
each involving 0.01 BTC. If the six-month price of 6 ounces of gold was 1.2 BTC,
then the first 20 of these mini-contracts would pay Alice while the remaining 80






rivatives contracts, like the one described above, typically involve va-
riable payments.76
2. Malicious "Looping" Contracts
Unlike the puzzle transactions, the failed gold-option contract does
not rely on cryptography. And, because payments are variable, it can-
not be readily expressed as an opened or closed lock. Such limits exist
by design because they protect the Bitcoin system from a malicious
attack. Broadly speaking, sophisticated smart contracts with variable
or contingent payments could undermine the entire Bitcoin system.
Consider the following example. If Alice wants to destabilize the
Bitcoin system, she might place some computationally intensive condi-
tion on a small transfer to Charlie. For example, Alice might create
the following malicious contract:
Step 1. Set the variable x to equal the number 1.
Step 2. Check to see if x equals the number 0.
a. If x does equal 0, give 0.001 BTC to Charlie.
b. If x does not equal 0, repeat step 2.
After analyzing this process, we quickly discover that it never termi-
nates. We set x to equal 1. Because x does not equal 0, we repeat the
process. After checking the value of x, x still does not equal 0, so we
repeat the process again. The halting condition (x equals 0) never
occurs.
Analyzing the language as lawyers, we would conclude that it fails
for impossibility (or impracticability).7 7 A computer, however, might
simply continue checking the condition ad infinitum. Indeed, such was
Alice's intent in our example. If she could deploy a contract like the
one above, miners could not evaluate it. Moreover, Bitcoin miners
would see all of their computational resources being diverted into a
futile attempt to evaluate the language.78
3. Economically Useful "Looping" Contracts
Bitcoin solves this problem by limiting the types of conditions that
users can insert into transactions. The type of condition given above
would simply be invalid in Bitcoin because the Bitcoin script cannot
76. Discrete payment options are considered "exotic" or nonstandard options. See
HULL, supra note 70. One can, however, approximate a single variable-payment
contract with several discrete-payment contracts. See BUTERIN, supra note 68
(describing several discrete-payment contracts as  "very inefficient hack").
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (discussing
impracticability under traditional contract law principles).
78. See ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 12, at 131 (warning against "an infinite loop or
other form of 'logic bomb' that could be embedded in a transaction in a way that
causes a denial-of-service attack against the bitcoin network").
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contain complex "looping" structures.79 The loop occurs because of the
direction to repeat step 2. A looping structure could, however, be con-
tractually important. Alice and Charlie might be derivatives traders
who agree to the following contract. Up front, Charlie pays Alice 1
BTC. In exchange, Alice agrees to pay Charlie 1.5 BTC if the price of
gold ever exceeds some threshold (e.g., $2,000 per ounce). Alice might
have to pay Charlie tomorrow, but she might not ever have to pay
Charlie at all. Alice and Charlie might like to automate their contract
using language similar to the example above:
Step 1. Charlie pays Alice 1 BTC.
Step 2. Check to see if the price of gold is greater than $2,000 per ounce.
a. If it is, Alice pays Charlie 1.5 BTC, and the contract terminates.
b. If it is not, repeat step 2 tomorrow.
As before, the contract has a looping structure (because of the direc-
tion to repeat step 2). But, unlike before, the contract has economic
meaning.
Nevertheless, because of the limits inherent in the Bitcoin system,
Alice and Charlie could not deploy this contract directly on the Bitcoin
blockchain. 80 The reality is that the derivative contract may not ever
terminate. There is no guarantee that gold will ever reach $2,000 in
the future. The fact that a contract does not have an ascertainable or
guaranteed end does not mean it should be disabled as a smart con-
tract. In our example, Alice and Charlie have an open-ended deal that
requires a daily check of the price of gold. A smart-contract platform
would need to allow a looping structure to facilitate their contract.
Since Bitcoin currently disables looping structures to prevent mali-
cious attacks,81 however, as stated above, Alice and Charlie could not
deploy their contract on the Bitcoin blockchain.
As described in the next section, the Ethereum cryptocurrency was
designed expressly to accommodate contracts like the gold-derivative
example above. It allows looping structures but suppresses malicious
contracts by imposing a charge (known as "gas") on the computational
resources consumed by smart contracts. Later, this Article will discuss
another complex aspect of the gold-derivative contract.82 Because fi-
nancial data (like the price of gold) does not appear directly on the
blockchain, the contract would need an outside source (known as an
oracle) to provide it.
79. See id. ("The bitcoin transaction script ... is deliberately limited in one important
way-there are no loops or complex flow control capabilities . . . ."). Thus,
Bitcoin's scripting language is not "Turing Complete." Id.
80. See id. at 131-32.
81. Id.
82. See infra subsection IV.A.3.
348 [Vol. 99:330
SMART CONTRACTS
C. Ethereum Smart Contracts
1. Introduction
In rough terms, we can think of Bitcoin as implementing a form of
property transfer law. That law is self-executing and does not rely on
courts or officials. Bitcoin also supports a very limited class of transac-
tions, known as smart contracts, that have traits of traditional con-
tracts. Bitcoin smart contracts are limited, however, to cryptographic
locks. They do not support variable payments or a full spectrum of
conditional payments.
Before proceeding, we should consider how to define the term
"smart contract." Many definitions refer to self-executing agreements
between parties.83 The term predates Bitcoin by more than a decade
and is generally credited to Nick Szabo, a legal scholar and computer
scientist. Szabo called a smart contract "a set of promises, specified in
digital form, including protocols within which the parties perform on
these promises."84 This Article adopts a more focused and less intui-
tive definition of a smart contract. On the Ethereum platform, a smart
contract is a computer program.85 Because Ethereum is decentralized,
the program must run deterministically; your execution must be iden-
tical to my execution. Because smart contracts are Ethereum transac-
tions, they can result in the transfer of value (ether) or the transfer of
data.86
In order to expand Bitcoin's limited system of smart contracts,
Vitalik Buterin created Ethereum.8 7 With a few differences outside
the scope of this Article, Ethereum implements its currency (known as
ether) in a manner similar to Bitcoin. In terms of cryptocurrency mar-
ket capitalization, Bitcoin is the clear leader with a market capitaliza-
tion of roughly $200 billion in October 2020.88 Ethereum occupies
second place with a market capitalization of roughly $40 billion.8 9
What distinguishes Ethereum is that it supports a much richer array
of smart contracts than Bitcoin. In particular, Ethereum supports
"Turing complete" smart contracts that allow for looping structures.
Ethereum supports its smart contracts with general-purpose pro-
gramming structures. In the prior section, we discussed two different
83. See, e.g., DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 75 ("Once the wheels of a smart
contract are put into motion, the terms embodied in the code will be
executed .... ").
84. Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 319.
85. ANTONOPOULOS & WOOD, supra note 34, at 127 ("[W]e use the term 'smart con-
tracts' to refer to immutable computer programs that run deterministically . . .on
the decentralized Ethereum world computer.").
86. Id. at 108.
87. BUTERIN, supra note 68, at 13.
88. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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smart contracts with similar looping structures. One was malicious
and was designed simply to tie up computational resources of Bitcoin
miners.90 The other, however, reflected an economic deal between two
parties who created a derivatives contract.9 1 The challenge for Ether-
eum is how to allow the beneficial contract while disallowing the mali-
cious one. Computationally, the two contracts seem similar, and there
may not be a feasible way to distinguish between legitimate and ille-
gitimate smart contracts algorithmically.
Ethereum's solution is largely economic. Ethereum users must pay
for the resources consumed by smart contracts. Recall that the mali-
cious contract92 created an endless loop; the value of x was always 1,
but the program does not terminate unless x equals 0. Bitcoin limits
its smart-contract system so that all looping contracts are impossible.
Ethereum, in contrast, broadens its system of smart contracts to make
the malicious contract possible but with a significant catch. On the
Ethereum platform, smart contracts do not execute automatically. In-
stead, they must be supported with the purchase of gas, which we can
think of as a user fee for the computational resources required by the
smart contract.93 Thus, the malicious contract is possible in Ether-
eum, but it is not economical.
As a single computer, Ethereum presents a problem of shared re-
sources. If I install a smart contract, every full user of Ethereum must
execute it in order to determine the appropriate ether balances. Out of
sloppiness or even malice, I might write a smart contract that is very
difficult and time-consuming for Ethereum users to execute. Bitcoin
avoids this problem altogether with a simple system of smart con-
tracts that I compared to a cryptographic lock. Bitcoin's simplicity is
incompatible with the more robust system of smart contracts that
Ethereum envisions. As a result, Ethereum deals with sloppy and ma-
licious contracts by imposing the gas fee on smart contracts. A mali-
cious, resource-intensive smart contract would generate a very high
gas fee. Unless the creator paid this fee, the smart contract would not
be able to execute. In contrast, simple and efficient smart contracts
generate lower gas fees.94
We also examined a more economically significant looping contract
that paid one party a fixed amount once the price of gold passed a
certain threshold.9 5 This arrangement can be expressed as an Ether-
eum smart contract as well. Depending on the economic significance of
the contract, the parties might find it useful to administer it on the
90. See supra subsection III.B.2.
91. See supra subsection III.B.3.
92. See supra subsection III.B.2.
93. ANTONOPOULOS & WOOD, supra note 34, at 105-06.
94. See id.
95. See supra subsection III.B.3.
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Ethereum platform and pay the gas charge. This particular contract,
however, is not an ideal place for us to begin our consideration of
Ethereum smart contracts. It has an added layer of complexity from
its use of external financial data. Before turning to such contracts,9 6
we will explore Ethereum smart contracts that do not require external
information.
2. A Smart Ponzi Contract
A Ponzi scheme may seem to be a dubious place to begin an exami-
nation of smart contracts. After all, they are a classic fraud and
scam.97 For a moment, however, let us suspend our disbelief and as-
sume that a Ponzi promoter is completely open and honest. We will
assume that the promoter will create the scheme using Ethereum
smart contracts. All transactions will be denominated in ether (abbre-
viated ETH), the Ethereum cryptocurrency.98
The promoter wants to offer the following Ponzi scheme. Partici-
pants enter the scheme by paying 100 ETH. Contributions by early-
stage participants go directly to the promoter because the scheme has
no pre-existing participants to pay. In later stages (e.g., after the first
month of the scheme), new contributions go directly to pre-existing
participants. Let us assume that participants automatically exit the
scheme after receiving 200 ETH (representing their initial 100 ETH
contribution plus profit of 100 ETH).
We can conceptualize this scheme as a physical box for collecting
money with rules for dividing cash as it comes in. The money is ether.
The box and the rules, together, constitute an Ethereum smart con-
tract.9 9 Most importantly, the Ponzi contract is deterministic and pub-
lic. Smart contracts exist on the Ethereum blockchain. Anyone can
read the computer code that creates the smart contract and observe
transactions related to the contract.100 Also, the Ponzi contract is de-
terministic. Anyone who observes both the Ponzi contract code and the
96. See generally infra section IV.A (discussing Ethereum oracles).
97. Ponzi schemes are, however, a common occurrence on Ethereum. See Massimo
Bartoletti, Salvatore Carta, Tiziana Cimoli & Roberto Saia, Dissecting Ponzi
Schemes on Ethereum: Identification, Analysis, and Impact, 102 FUTURE GENERA-
TION COMPUTER Sys. 259 (2020).
98. Ethereum (ETH), supra note 5.
99. See BUTERIN, supra note 68, at 13 (describing smart contracts as "cryptographic
'boxes' that contain value and only unlock it if certain conditions are met").
100. Even though smart-contract code is public and readable, it may not be under-
standable, even to sophisticated users. Typically, Ethereum developers write
smart contracts in a high-level programming language like Solidity. The result-
ing programming is compiled into a more compact machine code called EVM
bytecode. ANTONOPOULOS & WOOD, supra note 34, at 129. EVM stands for "Ether-
eum Virtual Machine." Id. at xxviii.
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ether contributions will be able to determine who receives the contrib-
uted ether.
In some respects, the Ponzi smart contract seems trivial and poten-
tially pernicious. Given the sad history of financial scams, we should
be wary about the creation of an automated Ponzi scheme.'0 ' Even if
we can overcome these concerns, it does not look particularly benefi-
cial. Participants are simply shuffling ether between themselves and
are not creating value in the way that a business enterprise would.
Nevertheless, the Ponzi smart contract has some interesting features
that point toward more substantial smart contracts. The contractual
terms are open for inspection,102 and so are all of the underlying
transactions. Moreover, the Ponzi smart contract is automated and,
thus, self-executing. Participants do not need to trust that the pro-
moter will actually follow the rules that it establishes.
3. Lotteries and Other Games
The Ponzi smart contract is "honest" in the sense that all partici-
pants can observe the rules and will be certain that the rules will be
followed. Economically, the contract shares some traits with a lottery
in the sense that participants can gauge their chances of winning and
the value of the jackpot. As with the Ponzi smart contract, lotteries
also just shuffle money between participants after giving the promoter
or sponsor a cut.
Could promoters create a lottery using a smart contract? Not eas-
ily. Recall that our Ponzi smart contract was deterministic.10 3 Money
comes into the smart contract and goes out according to an algorithm.
All honest observers who evaluate the money inflows in light of the
rules would have to agree on the money outflows. A participant who
contributes 100 ETH to the Ponzi smart contract will not know in ad-
vance what she will get in return. But, after others have contributed,
rules specify precisely how much that participant will receive.
Smart contracts cannot readily create lotteries because lotteries
are not deterministic.104 A lottery might rely on transactions to deter-
mine the total payout to the winner. However, lotteries use a random
number to select the winner, and random-number generation creates
a thorny technical issue for smart contracts. Suppose that our lottery
operates under the following rules. Participants must stake 100 ETH.
101. See generally David R. Hague, Expanding the Ponzi Scheme Presumption, 64
DEPAUL L. REV. 867, 871-80 (2015) (detailing history of Ponzi schemes).
102. But see supra note 100 (describing difficulties in reading the language of smart
contracts).
103. ANTONOPOULOS & WOOD, supra note 34, at 253 ("In order to maintain consensus,
[smart-contract] execution must be totally deterministic and based only on the




Participants identify themselves numerically (through their ad-
dresses), and a randomly selected address wins the entire pot. Be-
cause the contract language and transactions are public, participants
can be sure that the address identified as the "winner" does indeed
receive the entire pot. Yet, selecting the winner cannot be truly ran-
dom. After evaluating the smart-contract ode and transactions, all
users of the Ethereum system must reach a consensus about the iden-
tity of the winner.
The smart contract could, perhaps, designate an external agent
who selects numbers at random in order to identify the winner and
publishes this selection to the Ethereum blockchain. This solution
"works" in that it allows all users to reach a consensus about the iden-
tity of the lottery winner and about the lottery transactions. Yet, it
introduces a huge element of trust into the contract.105 Users must
trust that the agent selected a number at random rather than a num-
ber that she was bribed to select by a participant. For some uses (like
reporting objective financial data), oracles provide an adequate solu-
tion.106 The external agent does not offer a particularly appealing
solution.
Some actual Ethereum contracts use cryptographic hash functions
to create pseudorandom numbers. Recall that a cryptographic hash
function takes some textual input (e.g., the Preamble to the United
States Constitution) and returns a seemingly random textual output
(e.g., bdec063f22 ... ). A small change to the input (e.g., changing the
original spelling of "defence" to "defense") produces a very different
output (e.g., a0d9fda7f4 . . . ).107 A naive way to generate a
pseudorandom number would be to take the cryptographic hash of
some characteristic of the transactions. For example, the naive lottery
might take the alphanumeric addresses of participants and enter
them all (as a single input) into the cryptographic hash function. The
winner is the participant with the single address closest to the output
hash.
This approach "works" in that it will produce a deterministic win-
ner. All users could evaluate the smart-contract code and reach the
necessary consensus about the identity of the winner. The problem,
however, is that the random-number generator can be easily manipu-
lated.108 Blockchain addresses are easy to generate. A participant
105. Cf supra subsection II.B.3.
106. See Adam J. Kolber, Not-So-Smart Blockchain Contracts and Artificial Responsi-
bility, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 198, 208 n.33 (2018) (discussing Ethereum oracles).
107. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
108. See Emin Gun Sirer, How Not to Run a Blockchain Lottery, HACKING, DISTRIB-
UTED (Dec. 25, 2017, 8:05 AM), https://hackingdistributed.com/2017/12/24/how-
not-to-run-a-blockchain-lottery [https://perma.unl.edu/A8B5-UL6Z] ("[R]unning a
lottery on a blockchain is so incredibly hard to get right.").
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might generate (on her computer) several potential addresses and test
for one that makes her the winner.
Any solution to the random-number problem must have the follow-
ing characteristics. The winning number must be deterministic when
the winner is selected. Otherwise, the Ethereum community will not
reach consensus about the winner. The winning number must be
seemingly random when participants are deciding to join the lottery.
If not, participants will be able to influence the winning number or
manipulate the lottery. In short, a task as simple as pulling a number
from a hat is very difficult on the Ethereum platform. While a techni-
cal solution exists,10 9 the difficulties underscore certain limits in the
Ethereum platform.
In sum, Ethereum smart contracts rely on deterministic computer
logic that results in the transfer of the ether cryptocurrency. Two
problems follow from this observation. First, most economic relation-
ships do not rely on deterministic computer logic. Second, the vast ma-
jority of economic deals are not denominated in the ether
cryptocurrency. The next Part discusses how Ethereum addresses
these two problems.
IV. HOW ETHEREUM INTERACTS WITH THE "REAL WORLD"
A. Oracles
1. Interest-Rate Swap Example
Smart-contract proponents often point to derivatives contracts as a
potential use for smart contracts." 0 Consider an interest-rate swap,
which is a simple but enormously important type of derivative."' In
an interest-rate swap, the parties set a "notional amount," which is
used solely for computational purposes. To continue the example, as-
sume that the notional amount on a swap is $10,000. One party to the
contract (call him Fisk) will pay to the other party a fixed rate of inter-
est based on the notional principal amount. Suppose that the fixed
rate is 2%, meaning that Fisk will pay the other party periodic inter-
est of 2% times the notional principal amount. In our case, the no-
tional principal amount is $10,000, and Fisk will pay $200. Let us
assume that the payment occurs annually.112
109. The Niguez Randomity Engine purports to generate a pseudorandom number
while avoiding the perils described in this Article. See The Plutocrat, Niguez




110. See, e.g., Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 334-35 n.111.
111. See generally HULL, supra note 70, at 152-63 (describing interest-rate swaps).
112. See id. at 153-55 (describing hypothetical interest-rate swap). Typically, pay-
ments are exchanged every six months.
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The other party receives the fixed payment just described (i.e., the
$200). In return, this other party pays the fixed-paying party a float-
ing rate of interest. Let us call this floating-rate payor Variel. The par-
ties must agree to some floating rate of interest, and the traditional
choice is the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).113 With that
choice, Variel must pay Fisk LIBOR times $10,000. Again, we will as-
sume that Variel's payment occurs annually.
The parties will usually net their obligations." 4 A couple of exam-
ples illustrate how payments would be made. Suppose that on the pay-
ment date LIBOR is 2.5%. Variel would then pay $50 to Fisk: (2.5% -
2.0%) x $10,000 = $50. In contrast, suppose that LIBOR is 1.7% on the
payment date. Now, Fisk will pay Variel $30: (2.0% - 1.7%) x $10,000
= $30.
The market for interest-rate swaps is enormous. Measured in
terms of contract values, the market is worth trillions of dollars. Mea-
sured in terms of notional principal amounts, the market is worth
hundreds of trillions of dollars.115 Interest-rate swaps are important
because they allow parties, particularly financial institutions, to
transform the characteristics of their assets and liabilities. Consider a
simple savings-and-loan (S&L) institution that takes in deposits and
makes thirty-year mortgages. Its liabilities are its deposits (which are
functionally short-term debt payable to the depositors). Its assets are
the thirty-year mortgages. The S&L would be in trouble if interest
rates rise. Its depositors would demand higher rates of interest, or
they would withdraw their deposits. So, interest expenses would go
up. Its mortgage borrowers, in contrast, would pay no additional inter-
est (because their interest payments are fixed contractually by the
mortgage). So, interest income of the S&L would remain constant.116
113. See id. at 155. In the near future, U.S. financial markets will begin using the
secured overnight financing rate (SOFR) in place of LIBOR. See Gary A. Good-
man & Alice F. Yurke, The Death of LIBOR and the Afterlife, 34 PROB. & PROP. 8,
11 (2020); Jonathan R. Sichtermann, The Adjusted Interest Rate Problem: How
the Legal System Should Handle the LIBOR Scandal, 82 UMKC L. REV. 757
(2014) (describing the scandal that led to LIBOR replacement). References in the
text to LIBOR can be read as referring to SOFR with no difference in the
analysis.
114. See HULL, supra note 70, at 154 (describing net payments between parties to the
swap).
115. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES (2019), https://
stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/d7?f=pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/C5F3-DT9C].
116. See HULL, supra note 70, at 155-56 (describing how swaps can transform assets
and liabilities). Consider what would happen if interest rates fall. Now, the S&L
could lower the interest payments to its depositors without the risk that the de-
positors would withdraw their funds. So, interest expense would go down. The
consequences for the mortgages are somewhat complicated. Rather than continu-
ing to pay interest under the mortgage, many borrowers might refinance. As a
result, the S&L could not count on receiving the prior high rate of interest.
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The interest-rate swap would allow the S&L to hedge against a
rise in interest rates. The S&L would want to pay fixed interest and
receive floating interest (taking the role of Fisk in the prior example).
Now, if interest rates rise, the S&L would (as before) pay higher inter-
est to its depositors, but it would also receive additional income from
the interest-rate swap.117
Automating the interest-rate swap with a smart contract could of-
fer efficiencies. For example, the parties could avoid intermediaries
and could be certain of performance by the counterparty.118 We do
not, however, need to determine whether a smart contract interest-
rate swap is truly more efficient. Instead, we focus on it because it is a
common and mechanical arrangement that illustrates the power and
limitations of the Ethereum platform.
2. Implementing the Swap in Ethereum
As noted earlier, Bitcoin supports multi-party payments and a few
other structures that commentators often call smart contracts.119 In
that discussion, however, this Article concluded that many of these
structures seem more like joint ownership rather than contracts. For
example, one can readily transfer bitcoin to three persons in a way
that gives two of the three parties control over the transfer. Other
Bitcoin smart contracts operate like cryptographic locks, allowing a
party who satisfies the cryptographic challenge to take the offered
bitcoin.
Bitcoin does not offer a ready way to make variable payments.120
In our interest-rate swap example, payments are inherently variable.
Variel, in particular, makes periodic payments to Fisk that vary along
with the LIBOR interest rate. The Ethereum system, in contrast to
Bitcoin, allows for variable payments so long as the payments can be
expressed in computer code.121
Let us return to our interest-rate swap and sketch how one might
program it in Ethereum. We will start with Fisk's obligation to pay
Variel 2% of $10,000, or $200, once a year. A legal contract would need
to say a bit more than this, specifying the date of payment and per-
haps the method of payment. Let us assume that payment occurs at
117. If interest rates fall, the S&L would need to make a net payment under the inter-
est-rate swap. As noted previously, the consequences to the S&L for an interest
rate fall are less easily explained than for an interest rate increase. See id.
118. See generally id. at 157 (describing the role of financial intermediaries in inter-
est-rate swaps).
119. See supra section III.A.
120. See supra subsection III.B.1.
121. See BUTERIN, supra note 68, at 13 (asserting that Ethereum contracts have
"vastly more power than that offered by Bitcoin scripting because of the added




midnight on July 1 in 2021, 2022, and 2023. We can map this specifi-
cation of time into the Ethereum contract.122
Fisk must identify the payee, Variel. Identifying Variel in Ether-
eum can be done easily with an address123 that Variel controls. Variel
simply needs to specify to Fisk an address that she controls. Bitcoin
would work in a similar way.
Next, Fisk must specify the source of the payment. Unless enforced
by a court or other legal actor, the smart contract does not create per-
sonal liability for either Fisk or Variel. As a result, Variel should rea-
sonably demand that Fisk secure his obligation somehow. Fisk could
devote a certain amount of ether to securing his obligations under the
smart contract. Up front, Fisk would not know exactly how much
ether to post. The contract specifies payment in U.S. dollars, but ether
is the currency unit for the smart contract. Also, we are considering
Fisk's gross payment of $200 per year. Variel has her own liabilities to
Fisk, which we will consider in a moment. The most we can say is that
Fisk and Variel should each negotiate for the other to post a certain
amount of ether to secure their obligations.124
Finally, Fisk and Variel must deal with the problem that their eco-
nomic deal is in U.S. dollars. Fisk must transfer $200 to Variel on July
1 every year for three years. An Ethereum smart contract, however,
cannot deal directly with dollars. Instead, it can deal only with ether,
the cryptocurrency of the Ethereum platform. In order to fit their deal
into an Ethereum smart contract, they must change its specification
slightly. Fisk will transfer ether worth $200 to Variel on July 1 every
year for three years.
This specification creates a fresh problem. How can they incorpo-
rate this information into their smart contract? A smart contract is
122. See generally id. at 20-21 (describing smart contracts under the heading "Finan-
cial derivatives and Stable-Value Currencies").
123. In Ethereum, individuals generally use "externally owned accounts" to send and
receive ether. Id. at 13 ("An externally owned account has no code, and one can
send messages from an externally owned account by creating and signing a trans-
action .... "). To keep the presentation manageable for a legal audience, this
Article uses the Bitcoin term "address" instead of externally owned accounts.
124. More technically speaking, the smart contract is itself an actor in the Ethereum
platform. It would represent itself with a "contract account." Variel and Fisk
would transfer their ether to the smart contract's account, and the smart contract
would then pay funds back to them according to the terms of the smart contract.
See Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum Whitepaper: Ethereum Accounts, ETHEREUM,
https://ethereum.org/en/whitepaper [https://perma.unl.edu/4895-6KTV] (last up-
dated Oct. 9, 2020) (describing smart contracts as "like 'autonomous agents' that
live inside of the Ethereum execution environment, always executing a specific
piece of code when 'poked' by a message or transaction, and having direct control




simply a computer program,125 which itself is simply a series of logical
statements. The relative value of ether and dollars is not a matter of
logic. Instead, it is an empirical assessment of how markets operate.
The ether-dollar exchange rate is not, however, wholly subjective.
Markets do exist.126 That being said, different markets might have
slightly different prices. And, the price of ether might differ based on
whether we measure "bid" or "asked" prices.127 If Fisk and Variel were
negotiating a legal contract, they might be willing to allow for some
ambiguity in the valuation.128 Or, they could simply overlook the fact
that valuation could occupy some range of values. Once actual pay-
ment occurs, the parties might need to negotiate within some range of
values. To tie these observations to our hypothetical contract, recall
that Fisk must transfer ether worth $200. Depending on the precise
market observed, this dollar value might be worth between 0.999 and
1.001 ether.
For Fisk and Variel to implement their deal as a smart contract,
the value could not be subject to any ambiguity. Even if the parties are
willing to tolerate this small ambiguity, the Ethereum platform can-
not. Their smart contract is just a computer program; a small ambigu-
ity is just as bad as a large one. When any user of Ethereum runs the
computer program, they must get the same output as every other
Ethereum user. The system would not work if some parties think Fisk
must pay Variel 1.0005 ether while others think he must pay 0.9995.
Cryptocurrencies operate according to consensus,12 9 which applies to
a single set of transaction records.
Suppose that Fisk and Variel can identify in advance all the rele-
vant information needed to specify the correct market and other met-
rics that lead to a precise number of ether worth $200. Precision does
not solve all of their problems. Now, they must find a way to integrate
this precise information into their smart contract. As noted before, a
smart contract is simply a computer program, which is a series of logi-
cal statements. Even with a precise agreement, they must still under-
125. "Smart contracts are a new type of computer program that can be designed to
operate autonomously from a centralized operator." Jonathan Rohr & Aaron
Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the Democra-
tization of Public Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 463, 473 (2019).
126. See C. Daniel Lockaby, Note, The SEC Rides into Town: Defining an ICO Securi-
ties Safe Harbor in the Cryptocurrency "Wild West," 53 GA. L. REV. 335, 363 n.167
(2018) (describing cryptocurrency markets); Ethereum (ETH), supra note 5.
127. "Bid denotes the highest price the buyer is willing to pay, and asked denotes the
lowest price the seller will accept." Bid and Asked, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019).
128. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989) ("If there are trans-
action costs of explicitly contracting on a contingency, the parties may prefer to
leave the contract incomplete.").
129. See supra section II.C.
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take some analysis of the ether and dollar markets to arrive at the
precise value. Ethereum handles this problem with oracles, which al-
low Ethereum to incorporate data that is otherwise external to the
system.
3. External Information and Oracles
In our running example, Fisk and Variel need a way to identify the
ether value of $200 on July 1. Fisk will then transfer this amount to
Variel. Deployed as a smart contract, this deal can rely only upon logi-
cal operations that are applied to past Ethereum transactions. What
Fisk and Variel need, then, is to identify some Ethereum transaction
that specifies the ether value of $200 on July 1. Their smart contract
would then point to this other Ethereum transaction as containing the
necessary information.
The challenges in incorporating the necessary information high-
light a subtle difference between legal contracts and smart contracts.
If Fisk and Variel were negotiating a legal contract, performance
would be a private matter to the two parties. They could choose to be
exceptionally precise or somewhat relaxed in how they identify the
value, knowing that a relaxed definition might bring some interpre-
tive difficulties later on.13 0 With an Ethereum smart contract, how-
ever, performance would matter not just to Fisk and Variel but to the
entire Ethereum community. Their smart contract appears on the
blockchain and would need to be executed not just by them but by
other users as well. All Ethereum users need to reach consensus about
the execution of every smart contract.131
To facilitate this consensus, Fisk and Variel's smart contract needs
to point to another Ethereum transaction that contains the necessary
financial data. Creating such a transaction is not technically difficult
because Fisk and Variel could enlist a third party to create such a
transaction. Suppose they enlist Orrick, who promises to create a spe-
cialized Ethereum transaction that contains the data that Fisk and
Variel need, i.e., the ether value of $200 on July 1.
Orrick's transaction highlights an important distinction between
Bitcoin and Ethereum. Bitcoin transactions transfer ownership of
bitcoin. Ethereum transactions can do the same, but they can also
specify data output. Smart contracts, as noted earlier, are simply com-
puter programs. Orrick's transaction would itself be a smart contract,
which would allow Fisk and Variel to access the data they need.
130. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 128.
131. See ANTONOPOULOS & WOOD, supra note 34, at 253.
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Orrick and his smart contract are known as oracles132 within the
Ethereum community. More generally, oracles are necessary to incor-
porate data or information that is not otherwise present on the Ether-
eum blockchain.133 Oracles might supply information on financial
markets, the weather, sporting events, or anything else that might be
relevant to a contract. More subtly, oracles can also generate random
numbers, something the Ethereum platform cannot otherwise do
effectively.134
By identifying the oracle transaction, Fisk and Variel can now
specify, with complete precision, how Fisk will perform. Fisk executes
a smart contract that commits, up front, a negotiated amount of ether.
On July 1, 2021, 2022, and 2023, the smart contract will automatically
transfer ether worth $200 to Variel. To determine the amount of ether,
Fisk's smart contract will call upon a specialized oracle transaction
created by Orrick.
Recall that Variel has obligations under the smart contract as well.
She must transfer to Fisk an amount of ether that is worth a floating
interest rate (LIBOR) times $10,000. Variel faces the same dollar-to-
ether valuation problem that Fisk faced but must also determine LI-
BOR. The financial data she requires is different, but the solution is
conceptually the same. She can ask Orrick to create another oracle
transaction that specifies LIBOR on July 1, 2021, 2022, and 2023.
With the two oracle contracts, Variel can now specify the transfer
to Fisk. She executes a smart contract that, up front, commits a nego-
tiated amount of ether. On July 1 of these years, the smart contract
will automatically transfer ether worth LIBOR times $10,000. To de-
termine LIBOR and convert dollar amounts to ether, Variel's smart
contract will call upon specialized oracle contracts created by Orrick.
Fisk and Variel have more details to resolve. They would execute a
single smart contract that integrates the separate obligations each of
them has under the deal we have explored. That smart contract would
also integrate the information Orrick would provide about LIBOR and
the ether-dollar exchange rate. Fisk and Variel would probably want
to have the payments be made under a net basis.'3 5 Fisk always has a
132. Tatiana Cutts, Smart Contracts and Consumers, 122 W. VA. L. REV. 389, 413
(2019); Deborah Ginsberg, The Building Blocks of the Blockchain, 20 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. 471, 488 (2019); Marcia Narine Weldon & Rachel Epstein, Beyond Bitcoin:
Leveraging Blockchain to Benefit Business and Society, 20 TRANSACTIONS: TENN.
J. Bus. L. 837, 857 (2019); Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 336; Sarah Tem-
plin, Note, Blocked-Chain: The Application of the Unauthorized Practice of Law to
Smart Contracts, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 957, 961 (2019).
133. See Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum and Oracles, ETHEREUM BLOG (July 22, 2014),
https://blog.ethereum.org/2014//22/ethereum-and-oracles/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
DH4J-J6NA].
134. Cf supra subsection III.C.3.
135. See HULL, supra note 70, at 207 (describing netting).
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$200 gross obligation. If Variel had a $140 gross obligation, they could
settle the annual payment with a $60 payment (in ether) from Fisk to
Variel.
4. Evaluating the Interest-Rate Swap Example
Decentralization is one of the most important ideas and structures
of cryptocurrencies.136 To some extent, the interest-rate swap is de-
centralized. Consider how their contract would work outside the
Ethereum platform. Variel and Fisk might still need to post collateral
to secure their respective obligations under their contract. The collat-
eral would probably need to be held by a neutral third party who
would need to be compensated. Variel and Fisk might even find it dif-
ficult to contract with each other directly. They might each separately
contract with a trusted third party like an investment bank. The in-
vestment bank could handle collateral for each party separately and
perform other administrative functions under the interest-rate
swap.13 7 Using traditional financial markets, the interest-rate swap
may well be centralized and subject to administration by an invest-
ment bank or other intermediary.
The smart-contract variant, however, is not completely automated.
Variel and Fisk must rely upon an oracle (Orrick) to supply them with
necessary financial data. Orrick's presence does lead to some centrali-
zation. Yet, Orrick does not handle ether. During the life of the con-
tract, ether is held by the smart contract itself, which automates
payments. The Ethereum platform works like an automated escrow
agent, holding funds for the party until the deal directs that funds be
released.138 Variel and Fisk must rely on Orrick to supply information
but do not need to rely on any other intermediary, who would charge a
fee to Variel and Fisk.
Variel and Fisk cannot use the Ethereum platform for free. In or-
der to execute the smart contract, they must pay the gas fee.139 Ether-
eum (like Bitcoin) is potentially inefficient because it operates under a
principle of radical redundancy. One server with a backup is not suffi-
cient to maintain a decentralized organization. The community of
users can achieve consensus about ownership because many users
maintain an identical set of records. Each of these users would have to
execute the smart contract between Variel and Fisk. We cannot say,
136. See supra section II.C.
137. So long as Variel and Fisk are creditworthy, the investment bank has no net risk.
The two contracts (one to Variel and one to Fisk) offset each other. See HULL,
supra note 70, at 157 (describing how swap parties usually work through finan-
cial intermediaries).
138. See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 344.
139. See Cohney et al., supra note 52, at 603.
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with any certainty, that the smart contract format is inherently more
efficient than one administered by an investment bank.140
Unless assisted by courts, the smart contract cannot impose per-
sonal liability (like a contract would). To see why this is important,
recall the fundamentals of the deal. Every year, Fisk must pay $200,
and Variel must pay LIBOR times $10,000. Payments are netted.141
For the moment, focus only on dollar transfers (and set aside that they
pay each other in ether). They both set aside $200 to fund their sepa-
rate obligations. In the first year, suppose that LIBOR surges to 5%,
giving Variel a gross obligation of $500. After netting against Fisk's
fixed $200 obligation, Variel's obligation is $300. Variel has set aside
only $200 in the smart contract, and it all goes to Fisk. Variel still
owes Fisk $100.
If we interpret their smart contract as a standard interest-rate
swap, Variel has personal liability to Fisk. She owes Fisk $100 this
year, and she may still owe him more in future years. If Variel refuses
to pay Fisk, Fisk could sue her, obtain a judgment, etc. Had Variel
entered into an interest-rate swap with an investment bank, the bank
would likely monitor Variel's collateral levels on a periodic basis. As
LIBOR started to surge in our example, the investment bank would
almost certainly demand that Variel increase her collateral levels.142
If Variel refused, the agreement would likely give the bank the right
to terminate the swap contract.
Fisk and Variel could, conceivably, automate a process by which
collateral levels increase according to market factors. Yet, they would
face a now-familiar problem: the Ethereum platform does not incorpo-
rate market factors directly into its system. Fisk and Variel could turn
to an oracle to set collateral levels. However, this responsibility is
much more discretionary, open-ended, and continuous than simply re-
porting LIBOR and the ether-dollar exchange rate once a year. Orrick
might also find himself subject to regulatory burdens if he intervenes
too much in Fisk and Variel's deal. For now, let us assume that varia-
ble collateral levels are impracticable.
Even if the smart contract cannot impose personal liability, it could
take an intermediate step of terminating the smart contract if Variel
refuses to pay Fisk. This way, Variel would not enjoy any benefits
from the smart contract if LIBOR fell in the future. Fisk would also
140. It is possible that the smart contract format allows for smaller contracts than
what investment banks might allow. Variel and Fisk might be small business
owners who could find it difficult to do business with large investment banks.
Variel and Fisk might not present enough opportunity for profit.
141. See supra subsection IV.A.1.
142. Some exchange-traded derivatives require daily settlement. Each party's position
is valued on a daily basis, and parties whose positions are negative must pay a
margin to secure performance. See HULL, supra note 70, at 29-32.
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get his money out of the smart contract immediately. Nonetheless,
this early termination comes nowhere near solving the problem. If
Variel and Fisk want a three-year interest-rate swap with personal
liability, they cannot get it on Ethereum.143
Here, we may be seeing the first real cost of decentralization.14 4
Courts enforce actual contracts with personal liability. Ethereum has
no enforcement mechanism other than to direct the payment of ether
that participants have already committed to the smart contract. Thus,
the term "smart contract" is potentially misleading. For lawyers any-
way, a better description is "automated escrow."145 Parties commit
value (using units of ether) to a computer program which determines




In our smart contract examples, we saw how Ethereum allows for
conditional or variable transfers of the ether cryptocurrency. As a le-
gal construct, such smart contracts function like automated escrows.
Parties commit a certain amount of value (ether) that will be trans-
ferred according to the terms of the smart contract. Smart contracts do
not, however, create personal obligations (though courts might infer
personal liability from the terms of the smart contract or other deal-
ings between the parties).
So, we have considered the reach of Ethereum to personal liability
and external information. We will now consider how Ethereum (and
Bitcoin) can interact with external assets (that is, assets other than
ether). For example, corporate managers might want their sharehold-
ers to be able to transfer shares using the Ethereum blockchain. As we
will see, Ethereum tokens could allow for the transfer mechanically.
Ethereum tokens are, in effect, private currency issued by individ-
ual users.14 6 Users create this private currency using Ethereum
smart contracts, and almost all Ethereum tokens follow the form
known as the ERC20 token standard.14 7 In this Article, we can set
aside most of the details of creating tokens. We must, however, distin-
143. They could still execute a traditional interest-rate swap (which imposes personal
liability) and support hat swap with an Ethereum smart contract. The point is
that the smart contract does not function like the traditional contract.
144. See generally Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, passim (comparing smart con-
tract technology with contract doctrine and theory).
145. See id. at 344.
146. ANTONOPOULOS & WOOD, supra note 34, at 221; Joseph D. Moran, Note, The Im-
pact of Regulatory Measures Imposed on Initial Coin Offerings in the United
States Market Economy, 26 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 213, 246-50 (2018).
147. See ANTONOPOULOS & WOOD, supra note 34, at 227.
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guish between tokens (freely created by individual users) and
cryptocurrency (created by the system itself). Approaching the distinc-
tion by analogy, we can liken ether and other cryptocurrencies to dol-
lars. In contrast, we can liken ERC20 tokens to the metal tokens one
receives at a video-game arcade.
Ethereum and other blockchain tokens could conceivably represent
ownership in anything (like shares in a corporation). Some adherents
believe that tokens are the crucial application of Ethereum and urge
us to "tokenize everything"1 48 across all aspects of commerce. Skeptics
argue that blockchains are important but not of such universal use.
Blockchains consume a lot of computational resources because many
users must maintain extensive and duplicative records. Depending
upon the cryptocurrency, the "mining" process is also resource inten-
sive. The best uses for blockchains, according to skeptics, are situa-
tions where trust is difficult or impossible to establish.14 9
Shareholders in my hypothetical corporation might be inclined to
trust me and my corporation to see that share ownership is trans-
ferred appropriately. Or, they might find it relatively inexpensive and
easy to find a trustworthy third party to handle transfers.
This Article will not engage too deeply with this debate. Markets
are almost certainly better judges about the efficiency of blockchains
for commercial use. Legal observers should, however, ask whether
such uses are transparent. And, we should also be wary of such uses if
their efficiency lies in avoiding legal liability, regulation, and taxation.
As a result, legal observers should remain neutral about whether
blockchain transfers of corporate shares are efficient compared with
other means of transfer.
2. Utility Tokens
As noted already, Ethereum developers commonly deploy tokens in
order to give users the ability to control resources outside the Ether-
eum platform. Simple, non-Ethereum examples may be the best way
to begin. For decades, merchants and service providers would find it
convenient to sell special-purpose, physical tokens for goods and ser-
vices. Laundromats, video-game arcades, and public transportation
148. Sparsh Singhal, What Can Be Tokenized? The Tokenization of Everything,
HACKER NOON (Aug. 9, 2019), https://hackernoon.com/what-can-be-tokenized-the-
tokenization-of-everything-mwlay3bk7 [https://perma.unl.edu/ZK5T-W3M8]; see
also Tokenize All the Things, DECRYPT, https://decrypt.co/collections/tokenized-
world [https://perma.unl.edu/KX3Q-DZ27] (last updated Dec. 26, 2019)
("Blockchain technology, which eliminates the expensive middlemen (banks, bro-
kerages, agents) in finance, coupled with tokenization, makes it cheap and effi-
cient to create fractional shares in virtually anything.").
149. See, e.g., AMMOUS, supra note 24, at 261 ("Trustless digital cash has so far been
the only successful implementation for blockchain technology .... ").
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are prime examples.150 Chuck E. Cheese is a chain of restaurants that
serves pizza and has video games. Before the chain transitioned to
"Play Pass" cards, customers would buy (or receive) brass tokens they
could use to play the games on-site.151 The tokens looked like coins
and functioned like money inside a Chuck E. Cheese restaurant, al-
lowing customers to participate in recreation. Outside Chuck E.
Cheese, however, the tokens had no intrinsic value other than as
collectibles.
Ethereum developers can create tokens that operate in a way simi-
lar to the Chuck E. Cheese tokens. Such "utility tokens" appear on the
Ethereum platform and allow users to access consumer goods and ser-
vices. For example, an Ethereum developer might create Ethereum
tokens that allow users to play online video games or receive e-books.
Users would pay money (ether) in exchange for the utility token.
We should carefully distinguish the token (utility or otherwise)
from the currency. Inside Chuck E. Cheese, the distinction was obvi-
ous and visual. Paper and coins with dead presidents on them are cur-
rency; brass coins with a rat face on them are tokens. On the
Ethereum platform, the distinction is less obvious. Ether is the cur-
rency. It has value, measured in dollars and other sovereign curren-
cies, on fairly liquid markets. No one can create more ether because its
supply is limited by algorithm. In contrast, each developer can control
the number of utility tokens issued. Once issued, however, tokens can
be transferred in ways similar to ether itself.
"True" utility tokens may not present many thorny legal issues.
They are simply a way to sell goods and services over the internet.
They do, however, represent prepaid goods and services, which can
give rise to consumer-protection concerns. That being said, the con-
sumer-protection concerns do not appear to be different from concerns
that would arise when a consumer prepays for goods and services us-
ing U.S. dollars or other sovereign currency.
3. Equity Tokens
"Equity tokens" represent ownership of an asset. In concept, an eq-
uity token could represent ownership of a durable consumer good (like
a car or a home) or an investment asset (like corporate stock). Recent
years saw a surge in equity tokens issued in "initial coin offerings" (or
"ICOs") covering decentralized organizations.152 The ICO term is an
obvious play on the traditional "initial public offering" (or "IPO") used
in securities laws. Despite using the ICO name, many promoters
150. See ANTONOPOULOS & WOOD, supra note 34, at 221.
151. See Chuck E. Cheese, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChuckE._Cheese
[https://perma.unl.edu/4NY7-6482] (last updated Aug. 3, 2020, 7:59 UTC).
152. See Cohney et al., supra note 52, at 606-10.
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claimed they were offering utility tokens. By incorporating some con-
sumer goods or services into the token, the promoters believed they
could avoid the reach of securities laws.153 The SEC slowly but surely
affirmed the application of securities laws to ICOs, even those that
purport to be utility coins because they incorporate consumer-level
goods and services.154
For purposes of this Article, tokens are important because they are
a means to transfer non-blockchain resources using the Ethereum
blockchain. Thus, they link the Ethereum blockchain to the "real"
economy. Understanding this linkage helps us see limits on the ability
of Ethereum or similar platforms in replacing traditional legal struc-
tures. Suppose that a blockchain enthusiast wants to make an inter
vivos gift to you of a valuable painting. Rather than signing over the
deed to you, the enthusiast ransfers her unique token that represents
ownership of the painting.155 Before you take physical possession of
the painting, however, the enthusiast dies. Her heirs want to keep the
painting.156
Working solely on the blockchain, the token does not give you own-
ership of the painting. Suppose that the court rules against you, hold-
ing that the token transfer did not effectively transfer the painting to
you. The painting would belong to the heirs. Any attempts on your
part to retake the physical painting would be a theft. The problem is
that this token does not directly give you anything. For the token to
have value and to transfer the painting, the court must recognize it.
Consider a similar example but with a different outcome. Suppose
that a Bitcoin enthusiast wants to make an inter vivos gift to you of 1
BTC. The enthusiast transfers her 1 BTC to you in a manner recog-
nized on the Bitcoin blockchain. Later, however, the enthusiast dies.
Her heirs want the 1 BTC back. As with the painting-token example,
153. Investing in an orange grove was famously held to be a security under SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). Though not an aspect of the case, an added
benefit of orange-juice delivery would almost certainly not have removed the con-
tract from the reach of securities law.
154. See STRATEGIC HUB FOR INNOVATION & FIN. TECH., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
FRAMEWORK FOR "INVESTMENT CONTRACT" ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ASSETS (2019),
https://www.sec./corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets
[https://perma.un.edu/QEZ4-5AR3].
155. Cf., e.g., Jerry Brito, Houman Shadab & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin Financial Regu-
lation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 144, 205 (2014) ("For example, we could agree that a particular
bitcoin (or, indeed, an infinitesimally small fraction of a bitcoin so as to allow for
many tokens) represents a house, a car, a share of stock, a futures contract, or an
ounce of gold.").
156. Legally, the issue is whether the enthusiast delivered the painting to you or exe-
cuted "an inter vivos donative document." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) ("The transfer of personal
property, necessary to perfect a gift, may be made (1) by delivering the property
to the donee or (2) by inter vivos donative document.").
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all you received was a cryptoasset. Now, it is 1 BTC. But, unlike in the
painting-token example, your 1 BTC does not control any external as-
sets. Its value derives from the fact that market participants will pay
U.S. dollars for the 1 BTC. Also, and most importantly, you do not
need the assistance of any court to own or transfer the 1 BTC. It is
yours because the Bitcoin community and blockchain recognize it as
yours. As a technological matter, no court can seize the 1 BTC because
no third party (like a bank) administers Bitcoin.1 5 7
C. Summary
Oracles and tokens are two forms of smart contracts that allow
Ethereum to interact with the real (non-Ethereum) world. Oracles are
a source of outside information, allowing smart contracts to base pay-
ments on such information (e.g., interest rates or exchange rates).158
Tokens signify ownership of some resource other than ether.159 The
resource might be anything. It could be purely digital (like an e-book),
it could be land, or it could be anything in between on the spectrum of
property and resources.
The existence of oracles and tokens demonstrates that many (per-
haps most) Ethereum smart contracts cannot operate in a vacuum.
Without tokens, Ethereum smart contracts could not control external
resources. Without oracles, Ethereum smart contracts could not use
financial data or other external information.
Judges, regulators, and legislators thus have more ability to regu-
late smart contracts than some may have assumed. Because Ether-
eum is largely decentralized, they may have difficulty in directly
regulating the transfer of ether units between parties. But, legal au-
thorities can more easily regulate the external interactions of oracles
and tokens. Agencies might regulate parties that routinely supply fi-
nancial information as oracles. Courts might choose not to give legal
effect to certain types of ownership tokens. The next Part of this Arti-
cle gives a more systematic account of when legal authorities can and
cannot exert control over cryptocurrencies and related transactions.
157. See generally Andrew W. Balthazor, Comment, The Challenges of Cryptocurrency
Asset Recovery, 13 FIU L. REV. 1207 (2019) (examining difficulties in recovering
cryptocurrencies and related assets).
158. See supra section IV.A.
159. See supra section IV.B.
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V. A REMOTE-COMPUTER MODEL
A. Ethereum as a Computer
The Ethereum platform could itself be considered a computer.16 0
Consider what is on a typical personal computer. It has programs with
which you interact. For example, if you open a web browser and type
"weather tomorrow," you will be directed to a webpage that gives you a
weather forecast. Somewhat more formally, you provided input
("weather tomorrow") to a program (your web browser) and obtained
output (a webpage showing the forecast). Your computer also stores
data. For example, you might open a list of contacts and enter the
email address and phone number of a person you just met.
Returning to Ethereum, we can consider it to be a world computer
because it has data and also supports programs.161 In terms of data, it
stores balances of ether (its native cryptocurrency) held by various
users. Unlike your personal computer, however, Ethereum is shared
by a multitude of users.162 Moreover, for it to function properly, users
must come to a consensus about its data content. For example, abso-
lutely no one will stop me or even care if I open a spreadsheet on my
personal computer, name it "balance of all the money I have," and type
some really large number. Everyone else in the world is completely
indifferent about what is in this computer file. In contrast, users
around the world care deeply about the ether balances stored as data
on the Ethereum computer.163 To reiterate, ether units (and bitcoin
units) are simply computer data; they do not represent ownership of
any other assets. Unlike the data stored on your personal computer,
ether and bitcoin have economic significance because they trade on
markets.
Extending the computer model further, the Ethereum platform
holds data (like ether balances), and it also supports computer pro-
grams known as smart contracts. As discussed above, an Ethereum
smart contract can transfer ether in a way that is conditional or varia-
160. See Tonya M. Evans, Cryptokitties, Cryptography, and Copyright, 47 AIPLA Q.J.
219, 241-42 (2019) (describing Ethereum as a personal computer or world
computer).
161. See ANTONOPOULOS & WOOD, supra note 34, at 26 ("Ether is meant to be used to
pay for running smart contracts, which are computer programs that run on an
emulated computer called the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). The EVM is a
global singleton, meaning that it operates as if it were a global, single-instance
computer, running everywhere.").
162. See id.
163. We should understand ownership of ether and bitcoin as the ability to change the
stored data. If you own 100 ETH, I cannot simply change ownership to myself at
will. As the owner, however, you can transfer the 100 ETH to me (by following the
correct protocol for making a transfer). After the transfer, I control the 100 ETH
(because I can transfer it to someone else); you no longer own it.
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ble.164 For example, an Ethereum smart contract might implement an
interest-rate swap, by which parties exchange payments based on
fixed and variable interest rates. This smart contract implements
commitments by both parties because they must contribute ether to
the smart contract. Over time, the ether will be returned to the parties
based on the movement of the variable interest rates.
Smart contracts do not only control the transfer of ether; they also
supply information or data output. In the interest-rate swap example,
the smart contract cannot make payments based solely on computer
logic. It must rely on financial data (like variable interest rates). The
parties can receive this information from an oracle, which itself is a
smart contract that supplies information.165 Similarly, some Ether-
eum smart contracts require random numbers,16 6 which can be sup-
plied by specialized smart contracts.16 7
You and I might have personal computers with identical hardware.
Unless we took extraordinary measures, however, the two physical
computers would have different data and software. Ethereum, in con-
trast, is a single computer.168 No matter the user, it has the same data
and the same programs. This characteristic is directly related to the
consensus model of cryptocurrencies. Your personal computer and
mine can coexist with different data. No one is looking to either of our
computers for a record of values. Ethereum, in contrast, does store
value (ether balances), and the community must agree on these bal-
ances for them to have economic value. Thus, Ethereum (like Bitcoin)
is based on decentralized consensus rather than centralized
control. 169
The description of Ethereum as a single computer has importance
to our understanding of it as a system of property or even contract
law. Ultimately, the Ethereum platform determines ownership of the
ether cryptocurrency, and ownership of ether is simply data stored on
the Ethereum computer. Viewing the Ethereum platform as a single
computer means that there is a single set of data and programs that
determines ether ownership. An individual owns ether if and only if
ownership is reflected in that data. In determining ether ownership,
the Ethereum system does not rely upon any enforcement mecha-
nisms from courts or other legal institutions. Owners protect their
164. See supra subsection III.C.1.
165. See supra subsection IV.A.3.
166. Technically speaking, computers generate pseudorandom numbers. The numbers
are not truly random but behave like random numbers for a given purpose. See
Pseudorandom Number Generator, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Pseudorandomnumbergenerator [https://perma.unl.edu/G3RY-ZJBT] (last up-
dated May 27, 2020, 20:38 UTC).
167. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
168. See supra section II.D.
169. See supra section I.C.
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ether cryptographically, excluding others who would take the ether for
themselves. Owners also transfer ether with simple computer scripts
that function like deeds.
Earlier, this Article described Bitcoin as a computer.17 0 The bitcoin
cryptocurrency exists as computer data, associating owners with units
of cryptocurrency. As described in this section, Ethereum can also be
seen as a computer. Its underlying cryptocurrency-ether-is simply
computer data that associates owners with units of the cryptocur-
rency. The Ethereum computer, unlike Bitcoin, supports sophisticated
smart contracts, which function like computer programs. This addi-
tional feature supports the computer model of Ethereum.
B. Ethereum as a Remote Computer
After describing Bitcoin as a computer, this Article characterized
the Bitcoin computer as remote for legal purposes.171 Bitcoin operates
under principles of decentralization and consensus rather than cen-
tralized control. As a result, judges, regulators, and legislators cannot
readily exercise jurisdiction over the Bitcoin computer. A judge could
not easily order the transfer of bitcoin units to their lawful owner.
Legislators could not mandate consumer protections for stolen or lost
bitcoin units.
By describing Bitcoin as a remote computer, I mean that we can
imagine it to exist on a single computer in a legally remote (or "off-
shore") jurisdiction. In this remote-computer model, anyone in the
world can examine (or "read") the record of transactions and deter-
mine current ownership of bitcoin units. Owners still transfer units as
they do in the actual Bitcoin system, submitting their transfers to
miners who then submit their new blocks to the central computer. Ad-
mittedly, this remote-computer model obscures important structural
issues of consensus and decentralization. For legal purposes, however,
these structural issues are of secondary importance. The important
points are that Bitcoin is legally remote (because it is decentralized)
and purely digital (because it is backed by no external assets). These
are the traits of a single offshore computer that administers a private,
digital currency.
We can extend this remote-computer model to Ethereum. As with
Bitcoin, we can envision Ethereum as existing on a single offshore
computer. Again, anyone can see the history of ether transactions and
the current state of ether ownership. What distinguishes Ethereum is
its system of smart contracts, which can be used to create tokens and
oracles. In fundamental terms, smart contracts are computer pro-
grams. Thus, smart contracts are ntirely consistent with our remote-




computer model. The smart contracts will execute on the Ethereum
platform resulting in the output of data or the transfer of ether. Both
of these effects (data output and ether transfer) appear on the Ether-
eum blockchain.
C. Legal Significance of the Remote-Computer Model
With the remote-computer model in mind, we can more clearly see
the extent of legal authority over Bitcoin and Ethereum. Legal author-
ities will find it difficult or impossible to control the internal opera-
tions of Bitcoin and Ethereum because they are decentralized
computers that are functionally remote. For example, suppose that a
country enacts a transactions tax on all cryptocurrency transactions,
naively making the tax collectible by the central administrator. Be-
cause Bitcoin and Ethereum have no central administrators, the tax
would be ineffective.
Perhaps most importantly, regulators cannot force a change in the
ownership of bitcoin and ether. Suppose that Alice is insolvent, owing
several million dollars to Bob. Alice owns 100 ETH and transfers them
to an address secretly controlled by her son, Charlie. Alice has made a
fraudulent transfer, which is voidable by Bob. Although Bob might be
able to prove that Alice's transfer was fraudulent, he has a limited
ability to take the 100 ETH or reverse the transaction. His only ave-
nue would be to discover Charlie's identity and try to compel Charlie
to make a transfer. Only Charlie can transfer the 100 ETH because
only Charlie knows the associated private key.
In the remote-computer model, individual users may still interact
with the computer. Anyone can view the history of all past transac-
tions and the current state of ownership. Existing owners may also
execute new transactions that transfer cryptocurrency units to new
owners. Miners collect these new transactions, form them into blocks,
and add them to the blockchain. The actions of individuals interacting
with the remote computer are potentially subject to regulation or legal
control.
Legal authorities can thus exercise control over markets.'7 2 Sup-
pose that Alice wants to create an Ethereum exchange where partici-
pants come together to trade ether for U.S. dollars. In this example,
regulators can reach Alice's Ethereum activities like any other market
activities. When users act publicly, regulators have much easier
routes to exercise jurisdiction. Secondary markets, for example, have
arisen for the buying and selling of bitcoin units. These markets func-
tion like other financial markets and can be regulated. Speaking more
broadly, the remote-computer model lets us more clearly distinguish
172. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 25, at 306-07 (describing application of anti-
money-laundering rules to Bitcoin).
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between the internal affairs of Bitcoin and Ethereum (like ownership
of cryptocurrency units) and external affairs (like markets for bitcoin
units).
Based on their name, smart contracts may seem to be a way to
bypass traditional legal structures. Some futurists, for example, envi-
sion a fully automated law of contracts that execute on computer plat-
forms. Current technology, however, remains well short of full
automation. The remote-computer model gives an analytical tool to
approach smart contracts from a legal perspective. Smart contracts
are effective at transferring units of cryptocurrency without assis-
tance from courts.173 For example, a smart contract could specify the
conditions by which counterparties transfer ether to each other. Be-
cause the remote computer determines ownership of ether, the smart
contract can be effective for this purpose without further enforcement
by a court.
In contrast, a smart contract could not directly transfer other as-
sets unless a court or other legal authority enforces the smart con-
tract. Tokens, particularly equity tokens, may represent the clearest
attempt by blockchain promoters to interact with (or even displace)
traditional legal structures. The "tokenize everything" slogan supports
the idea that Ethereum tokens can be used to represent ownership in
a wide variety of assets, ranging from securities to automobiles. To-
kens, however, are a form of smart contracts, which are computer pro-
grams that run on the Ethereum platform. By applying the remote-
computer model to tokens, we see that they have limited power in dis-
placing traditional legal structures.
For example, suppose that a car dealer "tokenizes" its inventory of
automobiles. Whenever it sells a new car, it issues a token to the
buyer that represents ownership of the car. Alice buys a car from the
dealer and receives a unique token representing her ownership. Later,
Alice purports to sell the car to two separate people, Bob and Charlie.
She signs a state-issued paper document of title and gives it to Bob in
exchange for $10,000.174 Separately (and fraudulently) she transfers
the dealer-issued token to Charlie in exchange for $10,000.
173. See supra Part III. As noted previously, Bitcoin does have a system of rudimen-
tary smart contracts. See supra section III.A. Other cryptocurrency systems have
smart contracts as well. See What Are Smart Contracts? Guide for Beginners,
COINTELEGRAPH, https://cointelegraph.com/ethereum-for-beginners/what-are-
smart-contracts-guide-for-beginners [https://perma.unl.edu/LGS6-UCM7] (last
visited Jan. 30, 2020).
174. See generally 7A AM. JuR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 36 (2020) ("In
many jurisdictions where provision is made for the issuance of certificates of title
to motor vehicles, the sale or transfer of a motor vehicle is consummated by the




Clearly, Alice has committed a fraudulent transfer and should be
sued, prosecuted, etc.175 Bob and Charlie, however, have a matter be-
tween themselves: Which of them has a better claim to the car? Ac-
cording to the Ethereum blockchain, Charlie has a token that entitles
him to the car. But, this token does not give him any special access to
the automobile. His ownership is perfected only on the Ethereum
blockchain. Without delving too deeply into this hypothetical case, we
can surmise that Bob has the superior claim based on traditional legal
instruments.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cryptocurrencies, smart contracts, and tokens may well revolu-
tionize the law. But, the revolution is not inexorable. Cryptocurrencies
are, literally speaking, computer data and computer programs. Legal
actors cannot readily change the contents of these files and programs.
For example, a court cannot simply order that one party is the rightful
owner of 1 BTC nominally held by another party. As suggested by this
Article, we can view cryptocurrencies and the like as being adminis-
tered on a remote computer, which determines ownership of the
cryptocurrency units themselves. Because the computer is remote,
courts and the like cannot control it. Thus, they cannot control the
ownership of cryptocurrency, and cryptocurrency ownership is funda-
mentally important. Bitcoin and Ethereum, the two leading cryptocur-
rencies, have market capitalizations of $200 billion176 and $40 billion
respectively. 177
Yet, some proponents envision a far more pervasive role for
cryptocurrencies and their related blockchain technology. In this role,
smart contracts could replace traditional contracts for a wide range of
topics, and tokens could similarly replace many elements of property
law. For this revolution to occur, however, cryptocurrency platforms
need to interact with rights and obligations that originate outside the
remote computer (or outside the blockchain). Judges, regulators, and
legislators will continue to have an important role to play in recogniz-
ing this interaction. Such legal actors cannot determine the ownership
of cryptocurrency directly, but they can determine the ownership of
non-blockchain property. A regulator might, for example, fully em-
brace the use of tokens to transfer traditional securities. Or, a regula-
tor might rule that such use is invalid.
175. Cf generally 37 AM. Jun. 2D Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers § 1 (2013)
("Although one can generally dispose of his or her property as one sees fit, a per-
son cannot frustrate his or her creditor's rights and avoid obligations by changing
title to his or her assets. The fraudulent transfer of assets is considered a
tort .... " (citations omitted)).
176. See supra note 2.
177. See supra note 5.
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This Article does not attempt to say which approach is better. Con-
text matters. Regulators might have little reason to interfere with in-
vestment banks that trade derivatives between themselves using an
unalterable blockchain. Consumers, on the other hand, might not even
be able to understand the computer code that makes up smart con-
tracts. Judges, regulators, and legislators will continue to play impor-
tant roles as these technologies and markets evolve.
